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SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS
By DAVID L. RATNER*
To an American observer, the most striking feature of the provisions in
the proposed Securities Market Law for Canada (Draft Act) relating to self-
regulatory organizations (SROs) is their similarity to the comparable provi-
sions of American law. This is not really surprising, since the problems that
have arisen in the operation of self-regulation in the Canadian securities mar-
kets, as described in the excellent background paper by Peter Dey and Stanley
Makuch,' have closely paralleled the problems that developed in the United
States and provided the impetus for reforms in that country. Provincial securi-
ties commissions, cognizant of these problems, had adopted a number of
American ideas prior to the promulgation of the Draft Act; to this extent, the
Draft Act constitutes a codification of current provincial practices as well as
a response to the American experience.
There are, of course, significant differences, most notably in the fact that
governmental supervision of self-regulation in Canada has thus far been at
the provincial, rather than the federal level. But the problems that have arisen
in the relationship between the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), the most im-
portant stock exchange in Canada, and the Ontario Securities Commission
(OSC) have been quite similar to those that have characterized the relation-
ship between the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States. This is not sur-
prising, since the securities industries in the United States and Canada are
organized along very similar lines, and since self-regulation has certain distinc-
tive attributes and tensions that are likely to exhibit themselves wherever the
system is in place.
"Self-regulation" is a system under which all or a major portion of the
responsibility for policing the conduct of the firms in an industry is under-
taken by an industry organization, rather than directly by a government
agency. As Dey and Makuch note, the legislation in Ontario and other prov-
inces recognizing and modifying the self-regulatory system has never been
based on any clear rationale as to why self-regulation is preferable to direct
government supervision.2 Why has self-regulation, which is found in few other
industries, been so pervasive, and been accepted by goyernment, in the secu-
rities field?
The answer, I believe, lies in the nature of secondary trading in securities.
Unlike other goods that are produced and marketed by competing enter-
@ Copyright, 1981, David L. Ratner.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University; served as Chief Counsel to the Securities
Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee in its Securities Industry Study,
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1 Dey & Makuch, "Government Supervision of Self-Regulatory Organizations in the
Canadian Securities Industry" in Anisman et al., 3 Proposals or a Securities Market Law
for Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979) [hereinafter 3 Proposals] at
1399-1484.
2 Id. at 1433-35.
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prises and consumed by their purchasers, securities, once marketed, continue
to trade from hand to hand in a secondary market. To make this market effi-
cient, there must be a central facility in which the securities can be quoted
and traded, and that facility must have rules to govern the conduct of the in-
dividuals or firms entitled to use it. Stock exchanges began providing those
facilities, and imposing those rules, almost two hundred years ago in the
United States, and almost a hundred and fifty years ago in Canada, long before
government regulatory commissions came into existence.
When the speculative excesses of the 1920's revealed weakness in the
regulation by stock exchanges of their members, the response in both Canada
and the United States was not to supplant self-regulation with government
regulation, but to recognize and regularize self-regulation by the exchanges,
adding a level of government supervision to assure that the exchanges ful-
filled their obligations to the public. This scheme of "supervised self-regula-
tion," established in Ontario by the Security Frauds Prevention Act, 1930,3 and
in the United States by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4 marked a de-
parture from the pattern in England, where stock exchanges continue to regu-
late their members with very little formal government supervision." The self-
regulatory scheme adopted in Ontario, however, was far less elaborate than
the one established in the United States, with the Canadian SROs being given
very limited powers.
When the decision was made in the United States in 1938, and in Ontario
in 1947, to establish more systematic regulation of the "over-the-counter"
(OTC) markets (that is, securities traded outside the organized exchanges),
both jurisdictions opted for a new self-regulatory organization, subject to
government supervision, rather than direct government regulation. Again,
however, the functions delegated to the Ontario SRO were far more limited
than those in the United States. At that time, the OTC markets did not offer
any central facility that would have provided the natural impetus for self-
regulation. The subsequent introduction in the United States in 1971 of the
NASDAQ system, a computerized quotation system operated by the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), has made the OTC market much
more similar to a stock exchange in this respect.
As noted above, no explicit rationale has been enunciated for preferring
a system of supervised self-regulation to direct government regulation. It is
generally assumed, however, that self-regulation is less expensive and more
flexible than government regulation, and that it can be more effective in con-
trolling undesirable practices. The rationale of the assumption is that people
administering the system have both a better understanding of how the business
works and a pecuniary interest in eliminating unfair methods of competition.
At the same time, there is a recognized danger that self-regulators may be
under- or over-zealous, depending on their view of a particular practice, and
3 S.O. 1930, c. 39.
4 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-77jj (1976).
5 Supra note 1, at 1408, 1424.
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that their rules and enforcement activities may be tainted by a self-interest in
eliminating competition and protecting their own way of doing business.0
The question, then, is whether the changes proposed in the Draft Act can
be expected to strengthen the desirable features of self-regulation, while reduc-
ing the likelihood of its being perverted to improper purposes. While many of
the provisions of the Draft Act are similar to provisions of the American Law
Institute's Federal Securities Code (ALI Code) currently being proposed in
the U.S., the ALI Code provisions in this area are basically a reorganized
restatement of the present self-regulation provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended in 1975. The Draft Act seems designed to deal with
roughly the same problems with which the U.S. Congress attempted to deal
in the 1975 amendments, and can therefore be best analyzed by comparison
with that legislation.
An evaluation of the Draft Act must focus on several distinct but inter-
related questions: jurisdiction and allocation of functions; procedures for
registration of an SRO; SRO governance; procedures for changing an SRO's
rules; reconciling self-regulation with maintenance of competition in the in-
dustry; review of SRO enforcement proceedings and sanctions; and possible
civil liabilities and other sanctions for an SRO's dereliction of duty or for
violations of SRO rules.
Jurisdiction and Allocation of Functions
The most important effect of the Draft Act, of course, would be to trans-
fer supervisory responsibility over SROs from the provincial governments to
the federal government, a step that the United States took in 1934. While each
stock exchange is physically located within a single province, securities firms
in Canada, as in the United States, do business on a nationwide basis, and an
effective SRO must be able to exercise jurisdiction over all of its member
firms' activities. The Investment Dealers Association (IDA), which regulates
the capital and trading practices of firms engaged in underwriting and OTC
trading in non-speculative securities, is already organized on a national basis,
so that the present system results in "fragmented" supervision of its regulatory
activities by the securities commissions in the various provinces. The increas-
ing use of computers and electronic communications systems in the securities
business will of course hasten this "nationalization" of securities trading, so
that supervision of the SROs at the national level should produce a more effi-
cient and more effective system of regulation. 7
Since large securities firms may be members of several exchanges as well
as one or more associations, some agency must have authority to decide which
SRO will have principal responsibility for each firm in the event of overlap or
6 Id. at 1439-40.
7 The Canadian federal legislative jurisdiction under the "trade and commerce"
clause of the British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(2), has been read far
more restrictively than the American provisions giving Congress legislative jurisdiction
over interstate commerce. For a discussion of the jurisdictional basis of the Draft Act,
see Anisman & Hogg, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation" in 3
Proposals, supra note 1, at 156-76.
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regulatory gaps. This authority, given to the SEC by the 1975 Amendments, 8
would be lodged in the new Canadian Securities Commission (CSC) by the
Draft Act.9 Again, this is an authority that can best be exercised at the na-
tional level.
Registration of SROs with the CSC
One of the most important features of the Draft Act is that it would for-
malize the procedures and standards for registration of an SRO with the
Commission. This contrasts sharply with the present situation in Ontario,
where the law provides simply that a stock exchange must be "recognized in
writing" by the OSC, and expressly "recognizes" the IDA and BDA only for
purposes of auditing their members' financial affairs.10
The substance of the Draft Act follows very closely the pattern found in
the present American law and carried forward in the ALI Code, including the
criteria to be applied in determining whether an SRO meets the requirements
for registration." One minor difference is that the Draft Act would require an
interprovincial association of securities firms to register with the CSC, while
American law merely permits such registration.12 However, since the Draft
Act defines "association" to include only groups that actually supervise their
members or regulate conduct or entry into the business,' 3 dealers would still
be free to form non-regulatory trade associations which would not be required
to register. The Draft Act attempts to minimize possible dislocative effects of
the registration requirement (and thus to remove one possible basis for in-
dustry opposition) by a "grandfathering" provision which requires the CSC
to grant any application for registration made within 90 days of the effective
date of the Act by any organization that is registered or recognized under the
securities act of a province in the capacity for which the application is made.
The CSC may, however, require a change in the by-laws of such an organiza-
tion to ensure its fair administration or to bring them into conformity with
the Act.14
Registration of an SRO is of course only the jurisdictional handle to
enable the CSC to regulate its activities; the most important questions are
those relating to the scope and operation of that supervisory power.
8 See The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 17(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78q (1971).
0 Anisman et al., 1 Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1979), s. 9.05.
10 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 22.
"'Supra note 9, s. 9.01; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 8H 5,6, 15A
U.S.C.A. H§ 78e, 78f (1971), 78o-3 (1979); American Law Institute, Federal Securities
Code, Proposed Official Draft (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1978) thereinafter
ALl Code, POD] § 802.
12 Supra note 9, s. 9.01; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(a), 15
U.S.C.A. § 78o-3 (1979 supp.).
13 Supra note 9, s. 2.05.
14 Id., s. 9.04; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as originally enacted, did not
contain any comparable exemption, reflecting the fact that there was no significant state
regulation of stock exchanges at the time.
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SRO Governance
The Draft Act follows American law in requiring that an SRO's by-laws
"ensure fair representation of its members in the administration of its affairs."' 5
However, it does not require any representation of the interests of issuers and
the investing public on the governing board of an SRO. American law, as
amended in 1975, requires that one or more members of the board of directors
of a securities exchange or association be "representative of issuers and inves-
tors and not be associated with a member."' 6 The Ontario Act incorporating
the TSE goes further, providing for two "public directors" to be elected by
the board with the approval of the Ontario government.' 7 The NYSE, follow-
ing a recommendation by William McChesney Martin, changed its governance
system in 1972 to provide for a twenty-one member board of directors with a
full-time paid chairman, ten broker representatives, and ten "representatives
of the public, none of whom are, or are affiliated with, brokers or dealers in
securities."' 8 While smaller SROs may not warrant the degree of outside in-
volvement that is appropriate for the NYSE, it is surprising that the Draft Act
does not attempt to push Canadian SROs somewhat further toward represen-
tations of the interests of non-members in their governing bodies.
Changes in SRO By-Laws
One of the most sensitive issues relating to self-regulation in the United
States has been whether an SRO could change its by-laws or rules without first
obtaining the approval of the SEC. Prior to 1975, a stock exchange in the
United States was free to do so (although, owing to an anomaly in the law,
a securities association was not), and unadvertised changes in the rules of the
NYSE in the areas of market access and financial responsibility led to acri-
monious arguments between the NYSE and the SEC when the changes were
announced.19 Furthermore, both congressional committees that studied the
securities industry after the 1970 crisis were critical of the SEC for engaging
in informal private negotiations with the SROs over proposed rule changes
rather than putting them out for public comment.20The 1975 amendments
15Supra note 9, s. 9.03(1)(c); cf. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§
6(a)(3), 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78f (1971), 78o-3 (1979).
16 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(a)(3), 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. §§
78f (1971), 78o-3 (1979).
17 The Toronto Stock Exchange Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 465, ss. 6, 7.
'8 NYSE Constitution, Art. II.
19 U.S., Securities Industry Study, Report of the Subcommittee on Securities of the
U.S. Senate Banking Committee, Senate Document No. 93-13, 93d Congress, 1st Session,
[hereinafter Senate Study] at 172-75 (1973).
201d. at 201-204; U.S. Securities Industry Study, Report of the Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
92d Congress, 2d Session, [hereinafter House Study] at 110 (1972). In 1967 the OSC
rejected a suggestion by the TSE that proposed changes in the commission rate be re-
solved by private consultation, and ordered a public hearing on the question, supra note
1, at 1451-52. A short time later the SEC took the same position with the NYSE and
ordered its first public hearing on commission rates, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8324 (May
28, 1968). It is understood that informal private negotiation is still the dominant prac-
tice in Canada with respect to matters other than commission rates, although the Ontario
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changed American law to require prior notice to the SEC, with the opportu-
nity for public comment, before any rule change can be put into effect.21 The
Canadian Draft Act follows a similar approach, and also contains a provision,
found in present American and Ontario law, authorizing the CSC to require
a change in the by-laws of an SRO when such change is found to be neces-
sary to further the purposes of the Act.z2 This provision will be important
when the CSC seeks to require a by-law change that is likely to be opposed by
a majority of the members, as was the case in the United States when the SEC
ordered an end to the fixing of stock exchange commission rates in 1975. '
With respect to fixed commission rates, the Draft Act would specifically
authorize their continuance, subject to the CSC's power to require changes.2 4
This provision may raise a question similar to that which arose under Ameri-
can law prior to 1975-whether the CSC's power to require a change in fixed
commission rates includes the power to eliminate rate-fixing on some or all
transactions.2 5 The commentary on this section does not give a definitive
answer, although the provisions requiring that SRO by-laws impose "a re-
straint on competition only to the extent necessary to achieve the objectives
specified in" the Act 26 would presumably imply such a power if the CSC deter-
mined that fixed rates were not necessary to achieve such purposes.
The ability of an SRO to fix rates bears on another important question,
namely, what incentives there are for firms to join an SRO and subject them-
selves to its rules. In the case of a stock exchange, the ability to obtain access
to the trading floor and to take advantage of the more favourable commission
rate for members are obvious incentives. In the case of an association of
dealers in OTC securities, the incentive is less clear-cut. As a practical matter,
a securities firm must be a member of the IDA to participate in a national
underwriting in Canada, since the managing underwriter (generally an IDA
member) will choose only IDA members for the underwriting and selling
groups. 27 Similarly, in the United States a securities firm must be a member
of the NASD to participate in a national underwriting, since the rules of that
organization permit members to offer underwriting or selling group discounts
only to other NASD members. 28 The Draft Act would specifically permit the
IDA to establish minimum rates for OTC transactions (if it could persuade
the CSC that they were necessary to achieve the purposes of the Act).29 The
and Quebec commissions are now more frequently holding public hearings on important
by-law changes.
21 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (1979).
22 Supra note 9, s. 9.07; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(c), 15
U.S.C.A. § 78s (1979); The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 22(2)(b).
23 See SEC Rule 19b-3, adopted in Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975).
24 Supra note 9, s. 9.08.
25 See Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975).
2 6 Supra note 9, s. 9.08(b).
27 Supra note 1, at 1409.
28 NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, s. 25, authorized by The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 15A(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 780-3 (1979).
29 Supra note 9, s. 9.08.
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American law specifically prohibits an association of OTC dealers from set-
ting minimum rates and fees.30 However, in the limited area of underwritings,
the SEC recently approved NASD rule changes that specifically preserve the
right of a managing underwriter to set the price at which all securities must be
sold in a so-called fixed price offering.3 1 The proposed Canadian provision
would expressly permit this kind of exception to the normal rule of competi-
tion in the OTC market. 2
Effect of Self-Regulation on Competition
One problem raised by any system of "self-regulation" is that it authorizes
the firms in an industry, acting collectively, to impose restrictions on the
manner in which they will compete with one another. This automatically
brings the self-regulatory scheme into conflict with the laws prohibiting agree-
ments in restraint of trade, represented in the United States by the antitrust
laws and in Canada by the Combines Investigation Act.
33
Two questions arise. First, to what extent, and in what manner, should
an SRO be exempted from the laws prohibiting restraints of trade in order to
permit it to exercise its intended functions? Second, what safeguards should be
built into the regulatory scheme to assure that the protected activities of the
SRO do not unduly burden competition?
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the first of these ques-
tions on two occasions. In Silver v. NYSE, 4 in 1963, it laid down the basic
rule that repeal of the antitrust laws "is to be regarded as implied only if
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to
the minimum extent necessary." Twelve years later, in Gordon v. NYSE' the
Supreme Court was required to apply that rule in a suit alleging that certain
aspects of the NYSE's fixed commission rate structure violated the antitrust
laws. The Court held that "these requirements for implied repeal are clearly
satisfied here," and that the NYSE could not be held liable under the antitrust
laws for fixing rates.
In the course of Congressional studies that preceded the 1975 amend-
ments, spokesmen for the SROs requested an explicit legislative exemption
from the antitrust laws for their regulatory activities. Committees in both
houses of Congress rejected this proposal, finding that the test laid down by
the Supreme Court in Silver (Gordon had not yet been decided) was an ade-
quate and appropriate resolution of the conflict.36 It should be noted, how-
ever, that this rejection of a legislative solution of the conflict did not repre-
sent a judgment that the question was better suited to judicial than to legisla-
0 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(b) (6), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3
(1979).
31 Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 16960 (July 7, 1980).
3 2 Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 15807 (May 9, 1979).
33 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, as am.
.14 373 U.S. 341, 83 S. Ct. 1246 (1963).
35 422 U.S. 659, 95 S. Ct. 2598 (1975).
36 See Senate Study, supra note 19, at 233-40; House Study, supra note 20, at 160-
[VOL. 19, NO. 3
Self-Regulatory Organizations
tive resolution, but rather a concern that removal of the threat of antitrust
liability would encourage the exchanges to fight harder to preserve unjustified
anti-competitive rules. The approach taken in the 1977 bill to amend the
Canadian Combines Investigation Act,3 7 which would specifically exempt a
defined category of "regulated conduct" from the prohibitions of that Act,88
is very similar to the approach taken by the Supreme Court in the Gordon
case and would avoid the problem of having to await the outcome of litigation
to determine whether an action gave rise to liability. This seems to be a sen-
sible approach, assuming that the exempted conduct is subject to effective
government control to assure that it is not used for primarily anti-competitive
purposes.
That concern leads directly to the second question: what role should the
CSC play in assuring that SRO by-laws or rules do not unnecessarily burden
competition? In the United States, the 1975 amendments specifically provided
that the rules of an SRO must not "impose any burden on competition not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of" the Securities Ex-
change Act.39 The SEC may approve an SRO rule change only if it finds the
change consistent with this provision, as well as the other requirements of the
Act.4° The Canadian Draft Act follows a similar approach, providing that the
by-laws of an SRO may not "restrain competition to an extent not necessary
to achieve the objectives" of the Act.41 The CSC would be required to take
this standard into account not only in passing on proposed by-law changes, but
also in determining whether to set aside or modify a sanction imposed in an
SRO disciplinary proceeding.42 While provisions of this sort do not guarantee
that the CSC would give adequate weight to competitive factors, they represent
probably the best balance the legislature can strike in this difficult area.
Qualifications for Membership
There are two distinct legislative objectives in connection with admission
of members to an SRO. The first is to assure fairness in the decisions on appli-
cations for membership by particular individuals or firms. The second is to
assure that the criteria for membership do not unfairly discriminate against
certain types of firms on the basis of their other activities or the identity of
their owners.
The Draft Act pursues the first objective by providing that an SRO may
deny an application for membership only for reasons specified in the law, and
must file with the CSC a copy of any decision denying admission, together with
the reasons therefor.43 This is designed to eliminate the possibility of an appli-
37 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, as am.
38 See supra note 1, at 1471-74.
39 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(b)(8), 15A(b)(a), 15 U.S.C.A. H9
78f (1971), 78o-3 (1979).
40 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (1979).
41 Supra note 9, s. 9.03(4) (b).
42M., ss. 9.06(4)(b), 9.10(2).
43 Id., ss. 9.09(1)-(3), 9.10(1).
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cant being "blackballed" in a secret vote of the members, without being able
to find out the reasons for the denial."
The second objective is the one that has raised the more serious policy
questions, both in Canada and the United States. In the United States, the
NYSE has steadfastly refused to admit to membership banks, insurance com-
panies, mutual fund advisers or other types of financial institutions, or broker-
age firms owned by such institutions.45 The most acrimonious disputes in the
long battle over stock exchange commission rates resulted from the decision by
certain "regional" exchanges to admit institutions to membership, and thus en-
title them to "recapture" most of their commissions in transactions effected on
these exchanges.46 Even though the unfixing of commission rates in 1975 re-
moved most of the incentive for institutions to join exchanges, the securities
industry importuned the Congress to ban "institutional membership,"4 7 and
Congress obliged with a provision that bars any member of an exchange from
executing transactions for any institutional account over which it exercises
investment discretion.48
This prohibition has been difficult both to interpret and to enforce.40
(Ironically, its major impact has not been on financial institutions, but on
certain large NYSE member firms, which were forced to dispose of their in-
vestment advisory affiliates.) 50 The Canadian Draft Act wisely eschews this
approach, providing that an SRO may not condition membership "on the basis
of the volume of the required business or any other business that the person
carries on." 51 This is designed to assure that any financial institution that the
CSC permits to register as a broker or dealer may become a member of any
SRO, including a stock exchange. 52
A related question is whether foreign securities firms should be admitted
to membership in SROs. In the United States, this question has been inter-
twined with the institutional membership question, since European securities
firms are generally affiliated with banks. In Canada, the question is more
closely related to concern over domination of Canadian commercial activity by
large American firms, so that the Draft Act quite sensibly delegates responsi-
bility for that decision to the government rather than the SROs themselves. 8
44 Anisman et al., 2 Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1979) at 161.
45 See Senate Study, supra note 19, at 68-7 1.
46 Id., at 71-73.
4 7 1d., at 77-85.
48 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § lI(a)(1), (2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78k
(1979).
49 See, e.g., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 16406 (Dec. 5, 1979).
15 or example, Merrill, Lynch & Co. was forced to dispose of its investment
advisory affiliate, Lionel D. Edie & Co., which it sold to Edie employees for $8.4 million.
51 Supra note 9, s. 9.09(2).
52 Supra note 44, at 160.
53 Id., at 160-61.
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Review of SRO Disciplinary Proceedings
The present law in Canada with respect to the conduct and review of
SRO disciplinary proceedings is sketchy and haphazard, comparable to the
state of American law prior to the 1975 amendments. In Ontario, disciplinary
actions by the TSE can be appealed to the OSC, but there is no provision for
such appeal from actions by the IDA 4 In the United States prior to 1975,
a similar discrepancy existed, but in reverse, since disciplinary actions by the
NASD were appealable to the SEC, while actions by the exchanges were not.55
This led persons aggrieved by exchange disciplinary proceedings to seek re-
lief under the antitrust laws, a development abetted by the Supreme Court
in the Silver case in 1963 when it held that an exchange's failure to disclose
the basis for a disciplinary action deprived it of whatever immunity from the
antitrust laws it might otherwise enjoy for its actions.5 6
The Draft Act follows the approach taken in the 1975 amendments in
the United States, imposing basic due process requirements on SRO proceed-
ings, and providing for CSC review of disciplinary actions.67 In fact, the due
process provisions are considerably more detailed than those found in Ameri-
can law, incorporating many of the safeguards that the CSC must follow in its
own disciplinary actions. There is a sensitive balancing question here, since
an "over-judicialization" of SRO proceedings, while furnishing additional pro-
tection to the respondent, may make those proceedings as cumbersome, ex-
pensive, and time-consuming as the governmental proceedings for which they
are intended to be a substitute.58
SRO Responsibility for Financial Condition of Members
An important responsibility of SROs in both Canada and the United
States is to assure that their members can meet their financial commitments
to customers and others. In the United States prior to 1970, the responsibility
for determining how much "net capital" stock exchange member firms were
required to maintain was delegated to the exchanges, which maintained con-
tingency funds, financed by assessments on their members, to satisfy claims
of creditors of member firms that fail.59 A Congressional study in the wake of
the operational and financial crisis that engulfed the United States securities
industry in 1968-70 showed that the NYSE, which had maintained a similar
trust fund for the benefit of creditors, repeatedly "reinterpreted" its net capital
54 Supra note 1, at 1461-62.
r5 See Senate Study, supra note 19, at 151-53.
56 Silver v. NYSE, supra note 34.
57 Supra note 9, ss. 9.09(4), 9.10; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(d),
15A(b), 19(d), (e), (f), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78e (1971), 78o-3 (1979), 78s (1979).
58 In the U.S., however, there are still complaints about the fairness of SRO proceed-
ings; see Lowenfels, A Lack of Fair Procedures in the Administrative Process: Disciplinary
Proceedings at the Stock Exchange and the NASD, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 375 (1979); Poser,
Reply to Lowenfels, id. at 402. For a recent decision upholding NASD procedures against
a variety of constitutional attacks, see First Jersey Securities, Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F. 2d
690 (3d Cir. 1979).
59 Supra note 1, at 1412-14.
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rules to avoid putting firms out of business and thus triggering a "domino ef-
fect" which could have brought about the collapse of the entire industry.,"
The SEC was simultaneously incapacitated by the fear that the NYSE would
suspend firms from membership and thus remove the protection of the trust
fund if the SEC intervened.0 1
In December 1970, in response to the pleas of the industry, Congress
established a government-backed Securities Investor Protection Corporation
to take over the task of indemnifying customers of failed securities firmsA"
As a condition of doing so, however, it instructed the SEC to eliminate the
exemption from SEC net capital rules enjoyed by the members of the major
SROs, and to write its own rules governing financial responsibility of all
broker-dealers.6 The SEC did so, 64 and has also begun to move away from
reliance on a "net capital" test, which it found not to be the most appropriate
or flexible way to assure a firm's ability to meet its financial commitments0 5
The Canadian securities industry did not go through as serious a crisis as
its American counterpart, and the contingency fund maintained by the Cana-
dian SRO's to compensate customers of insolvent member firms is still in
operation. The Draft Act specifically recognizes and continues that fund as a
separate SRO.6 6 However, the situation in Canada differs significantly from
the situation in the United States prior to 1970. The capital requirements for
Canadian securities firms are set by the provincial securities commissions as
conditions of registration, and the SRO's merely perform audits to ensure
compliance with those conditions and with any higher requirements that they
themselves might impose. The Draft Act continues this pattern by authorizing
the CSC to establish standards of financial responsibility,07 continues the pre-
sent auditing practices, 8 and permits the CSC to delegate further enforcement
powers to an SRO.69
The American experience does not necessarily suggest that the approach
taken in the Draft Act is unwise, but rather indicates that, under the proposed
arrangements, the CSC should be especially vigilant, and ready and willing to
take strong action, in the event of major financial problems affecting the larger
firms in the industry.
6o Senate Study, supra note 19, at 29-32.
61 House Study, supra note 20, at 12. Note that the TSE took a similar position at
the time of the Windfall investigation, when it "apparently felt that once the Commis-
sion had been drawn into the affair the exchange was absolved from further responsibil-
ity." Supra -note 1, at 1426.
02 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ccc.
6 3 See Senate Study, supra note 19, at 39; House Study, supra note 20, at 31.
64 See SEC Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1975).
65 See Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 11497 (June 26, 1975).
66 Supra note 9, s. 9.13.
6 7 Id., s. 8.02(3).
68Id., s. 9.11.
69 Id., s. 9.05.
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Civil Liabilities
One of the most complicated legal aspects of a system of self-regulation is
the extent of possible civil damage liability for enforcement or non-enforce-
ment of, or non-compliance with, SRO by-laws or rules.
With respect to liability of an SRO for imposing sanctions that are sub-
sequently set aside by the CSC, the Draft Act specifically provides that such
action by the CSC would not affect the validity of the SRO action, and there-
fore would not give rise to civil liability, unless the SRO action violated the
Act or its own by-laws..70
An unresolved question in the United States is the liability of an SRO to
persons injured by its failure to enforce its rules with respect to a member
firm. A number of lawsuits were brought against the NYSE by investors in
the wake of the 1970 financial crisis, alleging that they had lost money as a
result of the Exchange's failure to enforce its net capital rules against some of
its members. While the courts recognized that such a right of action might
exist, all of the fully litigated cases resulted in judgments for the Exchange,
either on the ground that the Exchange's omissions were not related to the
plaintiff's loss, or that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue, or for other rea-
sons. 71 The Draft Act, like American law, requires SROs to enforce their rules
against their members (except when they are specifically excused from doing
so by the CSC),72 but does not deal specifically with the question of civil
liability.
A related, but separate, question is the civil liability of a member firm for
damages resulting from the firm's violation of an SRO rule. Courts in the
United States have reached varying and inconsistent views on this question,
depending in part on the nature of the rule, its place in the regulatory scheme,
and the seriousness of the violation. 73 In light of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions limiting the implication of private rights of action under the securities
laws, there may no longer be any such right of action for violation of SRO
rules in the United States.74
The ALI Code would resolve the problem by giving the SEC the power
to designate those SRO rules which would give rise to civil liability.75 The
Draft Act takes the position, novel in the Canadian context, 76 that the courts
should be able to imply a private right of action for a violation of SRO rules
if (a) it would not be inconsistent with the restrictions on express rights of
action and (b) the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons intended to be
701d., s. 9.10(5); supra note 44, at 164.
71 See Ratner, Securities Regulation (2d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.,
1980) at 922-23.
72 Supra note 9, ss. 9.03(1) (e), 9.14(1); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
19(g)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (1979).
73 See supra note 71, at 923-39.
74 See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F. 2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980).
75 See ALI Code, POD, supra note 11, § 1721.
7 6 Supra note 44, at 274.
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protected by the rule.77 This approach seems preferable to that currently being
followed in the United States by putting the responsibility for determining
whether to imply a private right of action in a particular case where it belongs
-in the court passing on that case.
Conclusion
This brief review of the self-regulation provisions of the Draft Act indi-
cates that it is a coherent, well reasoned proposal that would eliminate many
of the gaps and anomalies found in the present provincial laws. It would also
conform Canadian law more closely to the pattern of supervised self-regula-
tion now found in the United States, which has its good and bad features but
has overall proved to be a relatively flexible vehicle for dealing with certain
practices that do not warrant direct government supervision or intervention.
7 7 Supra note 9, s. 13, 16.
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